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By Rachel Zimmerman
Mary Robinson, a Philadelphia X-ray technologist,
received $300 and a $50 gift certificate to Toys "R"
Us as an incentive to enroll her seven-month-old daughter
in a drug trial to treat a form of indigestion babies can
get.
Merck & Co., the maker of the medicine,
also received an incentive: about $290 million. That's the
estimated revenue Merck will pocket from six months of additional
marketing exclusivity it won.
Its drug, Pepcid™, was slated to
lose its patent protection last October, opening the way to
low-priced generic competition. But, as a reward for conducting
the first formal studies of Pepcid in infants, the
federal government has given Merck a half-year of extra protection
from generics. And the gains are even greater for some of
the other companies rushing to take advantage of a 1997 law
meant to encourage pediatric trials of adult medicines.
That law, by giving
drug makers an incentive to test on children, is
producing important new prescribing information for pediatricians,
the Food and Drug Administration says. Labels have been changed
on 14 drugs to reflect new data. Some pediatricians are delighted
with the results and are lobbying to extend the law past its
scheduled expiration at year end.
But a close look at the law shows that
it is also producing an unintended consequence: a drug-industry
financial bonanza.
Stronger Sales
The studies required to gain six more
months of marketing exclusivity are relatively small and inexpensive,
costing anywhere from $200,000 to $3 million. But the extended
exclusivity that results can be very valuable. It will boost
drug-company sales by more than $4 billion, by the Wall Street
Journal's calculations, which compare six months of sales
while a drug has marketing exclusivity against typical six-month
sales of the drug after generic competition hits. Generics
typically knock a strong-selling brand-name drug's sales down
roughly 75%.
Benefits of
Pediatric Testing
Here are six of the drugs granted extended
marketing exclusivity under a 1997 law and estimates of how
much extra revenue the extensions could produce.
|
Manufacturer/Drug
|
Type
|
One-Year Revenue*
|
6-Mo. Addition
to Revenue**
|
|
Schering-Plough
(Claritin™)
|
Antihistamine
|
$2.60
billion
|
$975
million
|
|
Eli
Lilly (Prozac™)
|
Antidepressant
|
$2.21
billion
|
$831
million
|
|
Bristol-Myers Squibb (Glucophage™)
|
Diabetes
|
$1.73
billion
|
$648
million
|
|
Merck (Pepcid™)
|
Antiulcer/heartburn
|
$775
million
|
$290
million
|
|
Merck (Vasotec™)
|
Hypertensive
|
$850
million
|
$318
million
|
|
Bristol-Myers Squibb (Buspar™)
|
Antianxiety
|
$759
million
|
$284
million
|
The $4 billion of projected extra revenue
is just for the first 26 drugs tested under the program. About
200 proposals to test more drugs on children or infants are
pending at the FDA. If they get an FDA go-ahead, they could
add $6 billion more revenue to drug-company coffers, says
Chris Milne of the Tufts Center for Drug Development in Boston.
And over the next 20 years, if the law remains in effect,
producers of brand-name drugs could gain added revenue of
nearly $30 billion, according to an FDA analysis.
Big Ones First
As the numbers suggest, companies are
first testing mainly their big-selling drugs, where extended
market exclusivity is a potent lure. Only now are some companies
moving to test lesser-selling drugs about which pediatricians
have long wanted data.
Critics complain that drug companies are
sometimes gaining the six-month bonus by testing
drugs that treat conditions uncommon in children,
such as arthritis, ulcers and hypertension.
Another complaint is that the law sometimes
lets companies win extra exclusivity without doing much new
testing. At the same time, the law does nothing to promote
child testing of drugs that are already off-patent or no longer
marketed by a sponsoring company. An example is dopamine hydrochloride,
which neonatal nurseries rely on to stabilize blood pressure
in critically ill babies, but which has never been subjected
to formal pediatric trials.
Meanwhile, makers of generic drugs come
out losers. They could lose $10.7 billion in sales over 20
years as a result of the six-month extensions, the FDA estimates.
The agency sees ill effects for retail pharmacies, too, because
their markup on brand-name drugs isn't as large as on generics.
The six-month extensions could cost pharmacies $4.9 billion
in revenue over 20 years, the FDA estimates.
Public-Health
Cost
There is a public-health impact, as well.
The longer a drug maker fends off generic competition, the
longer patients -- particularly the poor and the uninsured
-- will be burdened by premium prices for their medicines.
The FDA estimates that the incentive law will raise the cost
of prescription drugs $695 million a year, or one-half of
one-percent of the nation's $100 million annual pharmaceuticals
bill.
"Pediatric exclusivity has created
a system of bribing companies into doing what the government
deems scientifically and medically necessary," contends
Abbey Meyers, president of the National Organization for Rare
Disorders.
'Win for Industry'
For their part, drug makers say they are
being appropriately compensated for meeting FDA requests under
the 1997 law. They didn't seek this law. But since its passage,
pediatric trials have become a key part of strategies to squeeze
every dollar out of strong-selling drugs nearing patent expiration,
some drug-company executives acknowledge.
"I won't deny it's been a win for
industry," says Ian Spatz, Merck's executive director
of public policy.
The law arose from frustration by pediatricians
and regulators who for decades couldn't persuade drug companies
to test many adult medicines on children. Doctors often prescribed
them anyway, cutting pills in half or grinding medicines into
applesauce, hoping to come up with doses for children that
were both safe and effective.
Between
70% and 80%
of medicines have never been formally tested in a pediatric
population.
Attempts at requiring testing have been
largely unsuccessful. Twenty years ago, the FDA ruled that
drug makers had to submit substantial safety and efficacy
evidence to label a medicine for use in children. The result,
instead of more pediatric trials, was more labels with disclaimers
saying effectiveness in children hadn't been established.
To the industry, testing drugs on children
is risky and burdensome. You're talking about a small population
where you have to take a lot of care and pay a great deal
of attention to the design, documentation and monitoring and
have adequate staff resources to ask and answer the right
questions.
The obstacles also include liability concerns
and the challenge of getting informed consent. And if a child
in a clinical trial reacts badly, negative publicity could
batter the drug's sales in every age group.
Dr. Kessler, the former FDA commissioner,
announced an FDA rule he hoped would finally move the drug
industry. It said that to get drugs labeled for use in children,
companies in many cases no longer had to conduct large, expensive
efficacy trials with children. They could do simpler tests
to establish safety and dosing ranges. Despite the relaxation,
companies continued to forgo label changes rather than pursue
pediatric clinical trials.
With few options, Congress and regulators
warmed to the notion of financial incentives. "We were
stuck. We had tried everything possible, every kind of other
incentive, and nothing worked," says Dr. Kessler, now
dean of Yale medical school.
Congress took up a bill to give companies
extended market exclusivity in return for studying medicines
in children. According to people involved in the effort, lobbyists
for the drug industry initially wanted five extra years of
marketing exclusivity, then two years and then one year, eventually
agreeing to six months.
Law's Flaws
The law's critics say it has loopholes
that undermine a laudable intent, such as allowing a financial
benefit for studies that would probably be done anyway. For
instance, Eli Lilly & Co. is winning Prozac™ six
more months of defense against generics -- worth an estimated
$831 million in added revenue -- by submitting a clinical
study that had already been completed in 1995, two years before
the law was passed, plus results of three studies that had
already been initiated.
A Lilly spokesman, Ed West, says that
while protocols for those three studies had been written before
the law passed, the final decision to proceed with them came
only after the financial incentive was in place.
He won't comment on the estimate of added
sales. In any case, Lilly couldn't have gained credit for
the tests if the FDA hadn't let it. The agency interprets
the law as permitting a company to submit certain already-conducted
tests -- and gain more marketing exclusivity -- as long as
the test results provide important new data.
In other cases, companies are doing pediatric
testing with drugs for conditions that aren't common in juveniles.
Consider Bristol Myers-Squibb Co.'s Glucophage™ for adult-onset
diabetes and Merck's Vasotec™ hypertension pill. Both
have carried labels saying safety and effectiveness hadn't
been established in children. According to market-research
firm IMS Health, of 24 million Glucophage™ prescriptions
in the U.S. in the past year, just 133,000 were written by
pediatricians.
For Vasotec™, the numbers were 11
million in all, 70,000 of them from pediatricians. But makers
of both drugs tested them in children and won extra marketing
exclusivity, potentially worth nearly $1 billion in added
revenue.
Critics from the generic-drugs industry
find another aspect of the incentive law troubling. A predecessor
company to GlaxoSmithKline won added exclusivity for the ulcer
drug Zantac™ by doing a study that gave an injectable
form of it to newborns with a condition called acid reflux.
The tests didn't involve the Zantac™ pill. But they yielded
a six-month extension for that blockbuster pill anyway, because
the FDA interprets the law as applying to a drug's active
ingredient.
Even the FDA acknowledges that there are
still some flaws in the process, which begins when a company
or the FDA expresses interest in a clinical trial. At that
point, the agency gives the company a written request for
studies. In a majority of cases, companies initially propose
studies that are unacceptable to the FDA, the agency's Dr.
Murphy says, or the companies reject FDA-proposed studies
as too large and costly.
Some of the sharpest criticism is that
companies use the law to extend their exclusivity on hot-sellers,
while often not testing other drugs that could help children
but aren't large revenue producers. The American Academy of
Pediatrics says there are still hundreds of drugs, on patent
and off, that need to be tested in certain age groups.
In the mid-1990s, Dr. Kauffman pleaded
in vain with Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. to test its Toradol™
pain killer on children, and finally did such a study himself
-- finding the drug to be as effective as morphine for postsurgical
pain, with fewer narcotic side effects. But the manufacturer,
a unit of Roche Holding Ltd., hasn't changed the label. A
spokesman says Toradol™ is "not one of our promoted
products."
The extra market exclusivity the law provides
is especially valuable for top-selling products. By conducting
pediatric tests of Vasotec™, Merck fended off generic
competition for this blood-pressure drug for six more months
last year, gaining about an extra $318 million in revenue.
After Vasotec's™ patent and the six months of extra exclusivity
finally expired in the fourth quarter, the drug's U.S. sales
fell 73%, Merck says.
Pepcid™ has been another big seller
for Merck, and the company won an extension through pediatric
testing despite having already shown Pepcid was safe and effective
in children aged one to 16. Doctors could have given seven-month-old
Julia Robinson an off-label Pepcid™ prescription in the
form of a liquid with a cherry banana mint flavor. Instead,
she became part of a clinical trial designed to test a diluted
version, after a doctor at Children's Hospital of Philadelphia
recruited her mother.
"They explained that it hadn't been
approved for kids under one and that's why she had to be in
the study in order to get it," Mrs. Robinson says. Julia's
condition improved, but the trial found that in most infants,
the diluted form wasn't as effective. Despite those results,
the FDA let Merck fend off generic competition for an added
six months for all forms of Pepcid™.
Merck says the study's findings were valuable
data that simply wouldn't have been produced without the six-month
incentive.
Even Younger
Schering-Plough Corp. should receive one
of the bigger boosts from the law -- an estimated $975 million
in extra revenue from Claritin™. U.S. sales of the antihistamine
last year were $2.6 billion. The drug is so important to Schering-Plough
that the company spent millions on lobbyists and political
donations in an effort to win special legislation extending
its patents, which start expiring in mid-2002.
That effort didn't succeed. But the company
did get an extension of its marketing exclusivity through
the pediatric law -- even though Claritin™ was already
approved for children aged six and above and was being widely
prescribed for them. Pediatricians wrote 3.6 million Claritin™
prescriptions in the 12 months through November 1999.
Six extra months of protection from generics
in a case like this upsets Carol Ben-Maimon, chairwoman of
the Generic Pharmaceutical Industry Association. "If
you're testing kids for valuable information, that's one thing,
but if you're testing them just to make another half billion,
that's exploitation," she says.
Schering-Plough spokesman William O'Donnell
declines to comment on the projection of added revenue for
Claritin™. But he says the pediatric study, by establishing
that Claritin™ could be used safely in children under
six and setting a proper dose, "met the intent and spirit
of the provision."
At the FDA, Dr. Murphy acknowledges that
a few companies will make "quite a lot of money on this."
But, she says, "that's the price you pay."
Wall
Street Journal February
5, 2001
Write to Rachel Zimmerman at rachel.zimmerman@wsj.com
if you want to give her any feedback on this incredible piece
of investigative journalism.
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